DOTr is Asking LTFRB to Increase PUV Supply
- TSE
- Oct 7
- 5 min read
Updated: Oct 8
In an official letter revealed to the public (as shared by ABS-CBN News), a rather unusual memorandum surfaced: the Department of Transportation (DOTr) issued a Notice to Explain to the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) regarding the lack of bus supply along Commonwealth Avenue.
We might not be very familiar with how transparency operates within government internal affairs, which can make this seem strange to the public eye. The LTFRB is a subsidiary or attached agency of the DOTr, and the letter's tone resembled an HR disciplinary order more than a directive for a specific sector.
The DOTr was reffering to a bus count audit along Commonwealth Avenue, one of Metro Manila’s busiest corridors. The survey showed that the number of buses per hour ranged from the mid-40s to low-70s — which the DOTr labeled “modest” compared to international benchmarks for bus rapid transit (BRT) systems, where capacities can reach 10,000–30,000 passengers per hour per direction. Acting Transportation Secretary Giovanni Z. Lopez demanded LTFRB to explain within five days why no action was taken to augment supply.
But this “scolding” memo reveals deeper cracks in how Philippine transport governance actually works. From the basic methods by which the LTFRB and DOTr determine the planning of the number of public transport vehicles to operate on the routes, to corridor specific transport governance and performance measurement mechanisms:
LTFRB’s Limited Levers
The LTFRB is a regulatory board. Its main function is to grant franchises to operators — it does not own buses, deploy units, or directly manage fleet operations. It has no network-level transit plans* known to the public, no real-time dispatching power (althought it has realtime monitoring of PUVs via a GPS system), and no budget to subsidize or contract out service. To tell LTFRB to “augment supply” is to ask a referee to jump onto the playing field.
(*Ironically, under the Public Transport Modernization Program, the planning of routes has been delegated to local government units (LGUs). For instance, the LTFRB has permitted Quezon City and Pasig City to conduct their own route planning.)
DOTr Holds the Purse Strings
If there’s any agency that can enable augmentation, it is DOTr itself — through the Service Contracting Program, where operators are paid per kilometer* to provide trips regardless of fare collection. But here, operators are wary. Running on Commonwealth during peak hours means dealing with crippling congestion (worsened by the ongoing MRT-7 construction), higher overhead costs, and uneven ridership demand along certain segments of their entire route. Without subsidy guarantees and operational clarity, many are reluctant to put more buses on the road.
(*Regrettably, despite undergoing several iterations, the service contracting program continues to rely on 'kilometers traveled' as the primary measure for contract terms and success, without incorporating other service quality indicators like commuting speed, reliability, comfort, safety, etc.)
Data Gaps and Missing Context
The DOTr memo also raises more questions about how we plan and monitor our transit systems. No details were published about where the bus counts were done, or how passenger demand was measured. Without matching supply with actual demand, the raw number of buses per hour doesn’t tell us much.
For instance, addressing crowding at Commonwealth stops could be achieved not just by deploying more large buses, but also by implementing shorter jeepney routes that feed into the corridor, or by offering more frequent services to certain segments.
However, this is something LTFRB has been struggling and will be awkward to advance, given its push for modern jeepneys under the Public Transport Modernization Program (PTMP). And these modern PUVs will not be readily deployable due to planning, acquistion, and financing constraints.
The Wrong Benchmark?
Finally, the use of BRT standards to judge the Commonwealth bus corridor is misleading. True BRT systems abroad run on dedicated lanes, with strong government subsidy and regulated frequencies, as a result of operational cost recovery scheme. The Philippine bus system, by contrast, operates in mixed traffic, with operators earning directly from fares, and with close to zero public funding, except for limited service contracting program and Libreng Sakay projects.
A Policy Note
What this episode shows is less about LTFRB negligence and more about institutional misalignment. LTFRB has limited authority to move supply; DOTr has the programs but struggles with design and adequate funding for road-based public transport. Meanwhile, commuters are stuck waiting at Commonwealth bus stops, squeezed between slow-moving metro rail system construction and an under-capacitated bus system.
Still, it is a welcome development to see this kind of communication accompanied by some technical work being shared publicly. After all, the LTFRB Board — as required under Executive Order No. 202 (1987) — is not specifically designed to have public transport planning professionals and experts. And the LTFRB itself has not published long-term plans and data about our current state of public transport.
Here are some key policy considerations:
Strengthening institutional coordination between LTFRB and DOTr to align franchise regulation with financial support mechanisms and prioritization.
Improving transparency of supply and demand data, particularly publishing results of bus counts, audits, and monitoring studies.
Exploring interim solutions, such as shorter jeepney routes to alleviate crowding in specific segments, while ensuring integration with ongoing modernization initiatives.
Mass transit option: Alternatively, outbound /return bus trips to their suburban bases in Quezon City, North Caloocan City, and San Jose del Monte City could be cut short so that they can more readily absorb passenger crowding at stops along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
This could be complemented by deploying “skip” buses — services that do not need to originate from the suburban terminals mentioned above — operated by companies with nearer garages.
Acknowledging infrastructure constraints from MRT-7 construction in planning service frequencies and turnaround times.
Equally important, provide a transition road map for bus operators that will be impacted by decreased ridership once the MRT-7 starts operating.
Defining realistic service benchmarks that reflect current funding and lane allocation conditions, while considering long-term transition to higher-quality service models.
Pursue long-term reforms in franchising and route planning to enable new service models and greater operational flexibility. At the same time, enforcement can be strengthened by leveraging the required GPS devices on buses, ensuring accountability and preventing potential abuse of such flexibility.
The devil is in the details — it’s in the governance design and technical capacity. Until these institutional gaps are addressed, commuters will keep staring at an eight-lane highway with little opportunity to board a bus.
